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Better Left Forgotten 
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST TREATING SOME SOCIAL 
MEDIA AND DIGITAL ASSETS AS INHERITANCE IN 
AN ERA OF PLATFORM POWER 
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy† & Ronit Donyets-Kedar†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Platform power is everywhere. From Google to Facebook to 
Uber, legal scholars are concerned with the overwhelming power of 
online platforms.1 Among the most pressing problems are data 
 
 † Visiting Faculty, Cornell Law School (2016–2017); Global Affiliated Faculty, 
Emory Law School; Associate Professor of Law, College of Law & Business, Israel. 
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School; Associate Professor of Law, College of Law & Business, Israel. We are grateful to 
Greg Alexander, Michelle Wilde Anderson, Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Lorna Fox O’Mahony, 
Martha Fineman, John Lovett, Stu Marvel, Tim Mulvaney, Jedidiah Kroncke, Mark Roark, 
Chris Serkin, Laura Underkuffler, Lua Kamal Yuille and participants of Progressive 
Property Workshop, The Vulnerability and Human Condition Workshop on Property, 
Vulnerability and Resilience at Essex Law School, the CLB Private Law Workshop, and 
IDC Law School Faculty Workshop for very helpful comments and suggestions. 
 1 See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and 
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2017) (arguing that Uber “can monitor and channel 
the behavior of all users” and that “their position as all-knowing intermediaries also presents 
unique opportunities for market manipulation”); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (“During the 
past decade, the problems involving information privacy—the ascendance of Big Data and 
fusion centers, the tsunami of data security breaches, the rise of Web 2.0, the growth of 
behavioral marketing, and the proliferation of tracking technologies—have become 
thornier.”); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 250 (2013) (“[P]erhaps the most oft-
cited example of the potential of big data analytics lies within the massive data silos 
maintained by the online tech giants: Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon”); K. 
Sabeel Rahman, The Shape of Things to Come: The On-Demand Economy and the Normative 
Stakes of Regulating 21st-Century Capitalism, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 652, 654 (2016) (arguing 
that certain platforms represent “a manifestation of deeper trends in the changing structure 
of capitalism, and the reallocation of economic power”). 
704 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:3 
ownership,2 economic surveillance,3 privacy,4 information 
asymmetries, and consumer protection.5 Platforms monitor, nudge 
users toward over-participation and over-consumption, and sell 
information.6 There is widespread literature that analyzes the 
problem of platform practices and suggests various regulatory 
solutions.7 Despite the vastness and prominence of these 
discussions, they neglect to address the role of platforms in shaping 
personhood, relationships, and memory. 
This role should nonetheless be salient in the discussion of 
postmortem access to social network profiles. Yet, the ongoing 
debate on inheriting digital assets remains largely oblivious of 
platform power, focusing on a much too narrow perspective.8 
When a user dies, family members may ask to access his or her 
social network account (on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or 
LinkedIn) and manage its content.9 In the recent past, platforms 
refused to allow access, resulting in a public outcry and prompting 
 
 2 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 339, 359 (2017) (“Barriers to data collection might also arise from limited 
information on who owns the relevant data, or on the costs of locating and contracting with 
such data holders.”); Linnet Taylor, What is Data Justice? The Case for Connecting Digital 
Rights and Freedoms Globally, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July-Dec. 2017, at 1 (2017) (arguing that 
a concept of justice is necessary to establish legal rules to the data economy). 
 3 Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 133, 159 
(2017) (discussing the “relative privilege and disentitlement in the evolving debate about 
the future of fair information practices in the era of pervasive commercial surveillance”). 
 4 Id. at 178 (“Many lawsuits against platform firms allege information 
privacy harms.”). 
 5 See generally Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 1, at 1631 (arguing that 
consumer protection laws are well equipped to address monitoring by platforms). 
 6 Id. at 1628. 
 7 See generally Rubinfeld & Gal, supra note 2; Cohen, supra note 3; Orly Lobel, 
The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 117 (2016) (“New technologies present 
new opportunities and new challenges for regulation. The rise of the platform adds new 
types of risk, implicating liability laws, consumer protection laws, insurance laws, 
employment and labor laws, and property and zoning laws. But they also provide new 
ways to address some of the very same social goals that law has attempted to reach.”). 
 8 See generally Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private 
Contracts in Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 
(2014) (arguing for reforming succession laws to include digital assets); Naomi Cahn, 
Probate Law Meets the Digital Age, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1697 (2014) [hereinafter Cahn, 
Probate Law] (promoting a reform in succession laws); Elizabeth Holland Capel, Conflict 
and Solution in Delaware’s Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets and Digital Accounts Act, 
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1211 (2015); James D. Lamm et al., The Digital Death 
Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital 
Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 385 (2014); Elizabeth Sy, The Revised Uniform Fiduciary 
Access to Digital Assets Act: Has the Law Caught up with Technology?, 32 TOURO L. REV. 
647 (2016); Ashley F. Watkins, Comment, Digital Properties and Death: What Will Your 
Heirs Have Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 193 (2014). 
 9 Banta, supra note 8, at 811 (“The increase in internet use makes access to 
digital financial accounts more important for caretakers and family members after the 
death of a loved one.”). Scholars and estate planners now encourage testators to grant 
explicit permission for family members to access online accounts. See Gerry W. Beyer & 
Naomi Cahn, When You Pass on, Don’t Leave the Passwords Behind: Planning for Digital 
Assets, 26 PROB. & PROP. 40, 41 (2012). 
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law reform efforts.10 Surprisingly, this important debate has not 
considered the role of platform involvement, including economic 
surveillance, monitoring, and nudging, in shaping new legal 
rules. This article calls for reevaluation of current legislation and 
contributes a novel perspective to these discussions. It 
emphasizes the need to protect users from platform power, 
motivated and fueled by economic interests, and exposes the 
structural conditions that distort and manipulate personhood and 
memory. To make this claim, this article focuses on one type of 
digital asset—social network profiles, such as those on Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn accounts, highlighting in 
particular personal profiles that have no apparent economic value 
to the user or to immediate family members. 
The core question in current regulatory debates is 
whether or not digital assets are inheritable property.11 The legal 
answer is now gradually becoming “yes.”12 The debate 
surrounding the legislation is mostly confined to a familiar set 
of arguments: the user’s presumed will, the interests of family 
members, privacy concerns, and terms of services agreements 
that underlie the transactions.13 Doctrinally, the question of 
access to the account has been quickly framed as a matter of the 
 
 10 See Naomi Cahn et al., Digital Assets and Fiduciaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 91, 94 (John A. Rothchild, ed., 2016); REVISED UNIF. 
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015); see also infra Section I.B. 
 11 See Banta, supra note 8, at 823 (“[P]rivate agreements controlling digital assets are 
the first widespread contracts to prohibit transfer of personal property instead of facilitating it.”); 
Cahn, Probate Law, supra note 8, at 1703 (“[N]ew technologies pose new conundrums for trusts 
and estates law. With every change in forms of wealth, technology, or entertainment, trusts and 
estates law has had to adapt correspondingly, with doctrines pressured to expand beyond real 
property to stocks, bonds, copyrights—and now, digital assets. Digital assets present the same 
problems as other forms of new property.”); Sy, supra note 8, at 648. 
 12 See Natalie Banta, Property Interests in Digital Assets: The Rise of Digital 
Feudalism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1108 (2017) [hereinafter Banta, Property Interests] 
(stating there is a “compelling argument that an individual has ownership over digital assets 
to the extent that she should be able to devise the asset at death”); Cahn, Probate Law, supra 
note 8, at 1703–04 (noting that existing trusts and estates law can be interpreted to 
encompass digital assets); Sy, supra note 8, at 648–49 (explaining the development of legal 
rules in the field, from state law to a uniform act and to the revised act). 
 13 Sy, supra note 8, at 653 (discussing a survey that determines Americans 
believe “the law ‘should err on the side of privacy when individuals die without 
documenting their preference about how to handle their private communication and 
photos’”); Cahn, Probate Law, supra note 8, at 1704–05 (“For most sites, a user enters 
into some kind of a terms-of-service agreement, clicking through a series of statements. 
While early terms-of-use agreements set out terms on a separate site, they have evolved 
towards a requirement that users click ‘I agree’ before being bound.”); see also Cahn et 
al., supra note 10, at 95–96 (“Stories abound of grieving family members and friends 
searching for answers, comfort and support in the social media accounts, voicemails and 
other digital assets of their deceased friends and relatives. For example, a teenage boy 
discovered the ‘ghost’ of his deceased father in a computer game they had played together 
when the boy was only six years old. While the monetary value of social media accounts 
is generally small, access to the account may be priceless to family and friends.”). 
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law of wills, trusts, and estates.14 Indeed, the legal discourse 
frequently refers to social network accounts as part of the user’s 
estate, devising legal rules that support this characterization.15 
This rhetoric has also permeated popular discourse.16 
Yet legal scholarship fails to consider the implications of 
this conception for users’ vulnerability in the face of corporate 
power. Social media companies have tremendous power over 
their users, and they control users’ experiences, information, 
and relationships.17 This article contends that a discussion of 
postmortem access is not complete, both normatively and 
analytically, without a full appreciation of the role of platforms 
in shaping memory and continuity. Access to profiles with no 
economic value (as opposed to Facebook influencers for 
example)18 is taken to project the personhood of the deceased, 
perpetuate her memory, and serve as a virtual tombstone for her 
loved ones.19 The question then becomes: what is the vision of 
self that is manifested in these user profiles? (a flawed, partial, 
hyper-documented vision).20 Social network sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter have a strong interest in collecting 
personal data for commercial purposes.21 They encourage users’ 
activity, including casual thoughts, occasional online activity, 
and incidental comments because each use produces profitable 
data.22 They accomplish this by documenting and preserving 
data for others to like, comment upon, and share.23 This all-
 
 14 See David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The Frontiers of Estate Planning 
Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 588–93 (2017) (discussing digital assets as part of the 
deceased person’s estate); Beyer & Cahn, supra note 9, at 41 (discussing the importance 
of planning the disposition of digital assets). 
 15 See Horton, supra note 14, at 548–49; Beyer & Cahn, supra note 9, at 41; see 
also infra Section I.B. 
 16 See EVAN CARROLL & JOHN ROMANO, YOUR DIGITAL AFTERLIFE 86 (2011) 
(characterizing private solutions for password management as “digital estate plans”). 
 17 See infra Section I.A. 
 18 See Yuyu Chen, Influencer Marketing on Facebook is About to Get More 
Expensive, DIGIDAY (Aug. 16, 2017), https://digiday.com/marketing/influencer-
marketing-facebook-get-expensive/ [https://perma.cc/C66W-HMU9] (Statement of Matt 
Britton, CEO of Crowdtap) (“Most brands are using influencers on Facebook to rely on 
their following base for organic reach . . . .”). 
 19 See Cahn et al., supra note 10, at 95–96 (discussing stories of grieving 
family members). 
 20 See discussion infra Part III. 
 21 Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of 
an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 78–80 (2015); see also NICK SRNICEK, 
PLATFORM CAPITALISM 6 (2017); DANIEL TROTTIER, SOCIAL MEDIA AS SURVEILLANCE: 
RETHINKING VISIBILITY IN A CONVERGING WORLD 88 (2016). 
 22 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 154 (“Platform users seek access to the essential 
social, commercial, and cultural connectivity that platforms provide, while platform 
providers seek access to the data necessary to create and sustain competitive advantage 
in their chosen field(s) of intermediation.”). 
 23 See discussion infra Part II. 
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encompassing preservation transforms people’s casual online 
activities into what is regarded as an online extension of users’ 
personhood, an “extended self.”24 According to Russell Belk, a 
prominent marketing researcher, “the Internet constantly asks 
us: ‘Who are You?’”25 Yet this seemingly harmless self-reflection 
conceals the power embedded in our digital experience. 
The article uncovers the connection between corporate 
interests and the agency, personhood, and relationships 
projected by social network profiles, and calls for a reflexive 
move in evaluating these important questions. In support of the 
claim that platforms’ active involvement in social network 
profiles significantly undermines agency, this article builds on 
the legal and philosophical concepts of agency, autonomy, and 
vulnerability. The term agency is defined in reference to a broad 
notion of selfhood, which is closely linked to, but does not overlap 
with autonomy, personhood, and identity.26 
In order to fully evaluate agency in social networks, this 
article engages with three theoretical approaches: (1) Joseph 
Raz’s self-authorship theory; (2) Jennifer Nedelsky’s relational 
autonomy account; and (3) Martha Fineman’s vulnerability 
theory.27 This article illustrates that despite their differences, 
each of these approaches calls into question the influence that a 
platform’s power and economic interests have on its users’ 
agency, personhood, and social relations. Relying on Christine 
Korsgaard’s interpretation, we take agency to refer to the ability 
to act in a way that constitutes ourselves as the authors of our 
movements, while at the same time making ourselves “into [the] 
particular persons that we are.”28 Unlike autonomy, then, which 
is a state of self-governing,29 agency here is an ongoing process 
of self-constitution. As Korsgaard puts it, in this sense, agency 
is not a state, but rather an “action itself.”30 
This article finally argues that we are constantly asking 
the wrong questions. Instead of asking whether profiles are 
property, we need to ask how the agency of the user within this 
balance of powers should be protected in the context of 
postmortem access to social network profiles. It contributes a 
 
 24 Russell Belk, Extended Self in a Digital World, 40 J. CONSUMER RES. 477, 484 (2013). 
 25 Id. 
 26 CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION: AGENCY, IDENTITY, AND 
INTEGRITY xii–xiii (2009). 
 27 See infra Section II.A. 
 28 KORSGAARD, supra note 26, at 130. 
 29 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 390 (1986). 
 30 KORSGAARD, supra note 26, at 44. 
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critical consideration to an ongoing debate and suggests possible 
modifications to current reforms. 
Part I of this article begins with a working definition of 
social network profiles, and identifies the interests protected by 
law. It then analyzes the current regulation of postmortem 
access to digital assets both in the United States and in Europe. 
Part II discusses theoretical approaches by Raz, Nedelsky, and 
Fineman, and studies the role of user agency and platform power 
in social networks, while highlighting corporate manipulation 
and economic surveillance. It further stresses the absence of the 
themes of autonomy, agency, and vulnerability from the current 
discourse. Part III reinforces this conclusion based on theories of 
property and inheritance, and explains the problem of memory 
and representation of the self in social network profiles. Finally, 
Part IV outlines possible implications for law reform. 
I. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SOCIAL NETWORK PROFILES 
A. Defining Social Networks 
Digital technologies are becoming a big part of our lives.31 
We rely on the internet for entertainment, banking, shopping, 
social interaction, and information.32 There are many differences 
among digital technologies, but as a matter of terminology, 
password-protected accounts are typically known as digital 
assets.33 This term casts a wide net, encompassing various types 
of digital presence. Digital assets include digital bank accounts, 
emails, personal documents, blogs, and social network profiles.34 
This article, however, does not attempt to make an overreaching 
argument concerning all digital assets. We discuss only profiles 
on social network sites (SNS) such as Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, Instagram, Flickr, and the like. Financial assets are 
different from email accounts, and the latter differ from 
 
 31 See DEBORAH LUPTON, DIGITAL SOCIOLOGY 1–4 (2015) (noting that “we have 
reached a point where digital technologies’ ubiquity and pervasiveness are such that 
they have become invisible”); see also Banta, supra note 8, at 800 (“The internet and 
computers facilitate nearly every aspect of our personal lives. Our personal records, tax 
filings, bills, music, communication, books, photos, videos, and even journal entries are 
stored on our computer or in ‘the cloud’ in digital form.”). 
 32 LUPTON, supra note 31, at 1–4; Banta, supra note 8, at 800. 
 33 Banta, supra note 8, at 800–01 (explaining that the “average American 
regularly accesses more than twenty password-protected sites, all of which could store 
personal information or assets. Our use of online accounts has created a new asset known 
as ‘digital assets.’”). 
 34 Id. at 801. 
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alternate life quests in video games.35 Grouping all types of 
digital assets together is problematic and potentially 
misleading. Social network profiles present a unique challenge, 
as they are often understood as a digital representation of social 
ties and a projection of the self.36 In fact, most profiles (as 
opposed to Facebook business pages) do not have an immediate 
economic value.37 For this reason, and in order to focus on the 
effect of corporate manipulation on memory, relationships, and 
expressions in social networks, this article discusses only 
profiles that do not have an economic value, and whose primary 
worth is personal and relational. 
SNSs have become a massive force in today’s society.38 
These sites function as online communities where users 
can interact and share information and preferences via posts, 
“likes,” videos, or photos.39 Social network sites are defined as “web-
based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and 
traverse their list of connections and those made by others within 
the system.”40 These sites have considerable cultural impact. 
Research shows that in 2012, Facebook ranked fourth among the 
most trafficked websites in the United States, and first in terms of 
photograph-sharing.41 A recent survey conducted by the Pew 
Research Center found that 68 percent of American adults have a 
 
 35 See Banta, Property Interests supra note 12, at 1102–03 (distinguishing 
between emails and social networks on the one hand, and digital media on the other). Yet, 
the discussion in the literature is often broad and not sensitive to the differences. See, e.g., 
Molly Wilkens, Privacy and Security During Life, Access After Death: Are They Mutually 
Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1037, 1039 (2011) (“Documents once found in wallets, desks, 
and safety deposit boxes are now accessed mainly through email and website accounts.”). 
 36 See, e.g., Soraya Mehdizadeh, Self-Presentation 2.0: Narcissism and Self-Esteem 
on Facebook, 13 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 357, 357–58 (2010). 
 37 Cf. Sally Brown Richardson, Classifying Virtual Property in Community Property 
Regimes: Are My Facebook Friends Considered Earnings, Profits, Increases in Value, or 
Goodwill?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 717, 755–57 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson, Virtual Property] 
(distinguishing personal profiles from business pages, though treating all of them as property). 
 38 Id. at 720–21. 
 39 Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in 
the Legal Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 358 (2010). 
 40 danah boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, 
and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2007). 
 41 Donghee Sinn & Sue Yeon Syn, Personal Documentation on a Social 
Network Site: Facebook, a Collection of Moments from Your Life?, 14 J. ARCHIVAL SCI. 
95, 98–99 (2014); see also James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1149 (“Facebook knows an immense amount about its users. A fully filled-
out Facebook profile contains about forty pieces of recognizably personal information, 
including name; birthday; political and religious views; online and offline contact 
information; gender, sexual preference, and relationship status; favorite books, movies, 
and so on; educational and employment history; and, of course, picture.”). 
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Facebook profile and about three-quarters of them access it daily.42 
A previous study found that “[a] majority of Americans now say 
they get news via social media, and half of the public has turned to 
these sites to learn about the 2016 presidential election.”43 
Similarly, as of June 2017, the most downloaded app of all time is 
Facebook, and the fourth is Instagram.44 
Social media activity typically includes a personal profile 
that contains the user’s biographical information (name, 
birthday, residence, and education), familial status, personal 
tastes, and list of friends.45 These profiles, however, are not just 
aggregated personal information. They encourage users to 
communicate with one another through likes, shares, comments, 
and birthday wishes.46 Profiles create hubs for social and 
communal interaction as well as a platform for self-expression.47 
The combination of information, social activity, and the 
projection of the self in social network sites makes profiles very 
hard to characterize legally. Are personal accounts expressions, 
a service, or property? Legal scholarship has addressed some of 
these questions,48 and we will briefly mention the interests that 
are particularly important for the study of users’ autonomy and 
agency and its impact on personhood and relationships. 
Three legal interests are particularly important for our 
purpose here: (1) social networks serve as a unique locus or mode 
of expression; (2) social networks’ function as a public utility; and 
(3) social network profiles as property. These interests are 
distinct but may overlap. First, social network activity is a form 
 
 42 Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018, PEW RES. CTR. 
1, 2 (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/5HBZ-92GN]. 
 43 Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media Update 2016, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 2 
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/TA9U-JANC]. 
 44 Chauncey Neyman, A Survey of Addictive Software Design (June 2017) 
(unpublished thesis, California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo), 
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cscsp/111 [https://perma.cc/4L7F-R32A]. 
 45 Grimmelmann, supra note 41, at 1149. 
 46 See David Kasch, Social Media Selves: College Students’ Curation of Self 
and Others Through Facebook 94, 99, 187 (2013) (PhD Dissertation, University of 
California, Los Angeles). 
 47 Grimmelmann, supra note 41, at 1157 (“[A] social network site lets you 
establish your social position. The basic desire is simple and age-old: to be recognized as 
a valued member of one’s various communities. On social network sites, this desire to fit 
in and be noticed has several important consequences. The most basic consequence of 
this desire is that people would enjoy using a social network site even if they had no 
reason to use it other than that their friends enjoy using it. If your friends are at the 
mall, you join them at the mall; if they’re on Facebook, you join them on Facebook.”). 
 48 See id. at 1197 (“Thus, when the police get the information by demanding it 
from Facebook the company (rather than by logging in as users or having someone log 
in for them), they should be required to present a search warrant.”); Richardson, Virtual 
Property, supra note 37. 
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of expression. In a recent Supreme Court case, Packingham v. 
North Carolina, the Court determined that access to social 
media sites is protected by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.49 Expressions on social networks are diverse and 
include debating religious and political issues, sharing vacation 
photos, and connecting with elected representatives.50 One of the 
many justifications for First Amendment protection of access to 
these platforms is a respect for the autonomy and dignity of 
individuals.51 According to the autonomy-argument, forms of 
communication and information are essential in making 
autonomous choices.52 In addition, from the speaker’s 
perspective, we need to listen to each other, or at least allow the 
opportunity to speak and to listen as a matter of basic human 
respect.53 Social networks should allow people to express their 
own views and expose them to the views of others. 
Second, certain scholars argue that social network sites 
are a public utility and should be regulated as such.54 According 
to the argument, social networks are an essential good in the 
digital world, controlled by private power.55 These sites control 
information and facilitate communication with others, including 
the “distribution of and access to news, ideas, and information 
upon which our economy, culture, and increasingly politics 
depend.”56 This characterization exposes an inherent dependency 
of users on social media providers, one that if left unregulated, 
may expose them to harm. 
A third legal interest in social network profiles is 
property. Property is a difficult interest to unpack. It has many 
different interpretations and justifications, and there are 
diverse legal problems that have a property-related aspect.57 
 
 49 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) 
(determining that “Social media offers ‘relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for 
communication of all kinds’” and “social media users employ [various] websites to engage 
in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human 
thought’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997))). 
 50 Id. at 1735. 
 51 Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 150–53 (1989). 
 52 Id. at 150–51. 
 53 Id. at 152–53. 
 54 K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, 
and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1640–41 (2018). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1670. 
 57 See, e.g., JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, 
COMMUNITY, AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (2011) (discussing property as serving the 
purposes of a community of free and equal members); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517 (2003) (arguing that property is a group of institutions with different 
social functions); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 275 (2008) (arguing that property represents an exclusive power); J.E. Penner, The 
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996) (discussing the bundle 
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Intellectual property, in particular, is one of the major concerns 
of digital society.58 On Facebook, there is a clear distinction 
between content and profile. While the user owns all the 
information and other content he or she posts on Facebook, the 
actual use of the profile depends on Facebook’s terms of service.59 
The legal characterization of the profile itself, not the 
information per se, is more challenging and merits further 
investigation, as the following parts explain. 
Other property-related problems deal mostly with the 
economic value of a user profile, especially in cases where the 
profile was used for business purposes. Bankruptcy60 and 
divorce61 are prominent examples. In such cases, the rules are 
less interested in the personal value of the profile.62 Personal 
profiles, which lack any immediate financial value, are more 
common.63 When scholars and practitioners argue in favor of 
inheriting social network profiles, they engage with personal 
value directly.64 Yet they typically do not attempt to explain, 
justify, or theorize the characterization of profiles as property.65 
These different legal interests reflect the centrality of 
questions of agency, self-representation, and relationships, as 
well as the vulnerability of users in social media, both of which 
are nonetheless absent from current legal discussion. The 
expression discourse brings to the fore issues pertaining to users’ 
autonomy. The public utility debate uncovers the importance of 
regulating private power and the vulnerability of users to the 
potential harm posed by this unregulated power. The property 
discourse raises questions that touch upon the theoretical  
of sticks approach to property); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (offering a relational approach to property). 
 58 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and 
Disintegration of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1523, 
1524 (2011) (“As technological progress and the digital revolution have reshaped the 
economic and social landscape . . . . The major titans of industry are no longer General 
Motors and U.S. Steel, but Google, Apple, Microsoft, and eBay. Their key assets and 
products are intellectual, not tangible.”). 
 59 See Sally Brown Richardson, How Community Property Jurisdictions Can 
Avoid Being Lost in Cyberspace, 72 LA. L. REV. 89, 119 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson, 
Community Property]. 
 60 Alexandra L. Jamel, Mixing Business with Pleasure: Evaluating the Blurred 
Line Between the Ownership of Business and Personal Social Media Accounts under 
§ 541(A)(1), 33 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 561, 562–63 (2017). 
 61 Richardson, Community Property, supra note 59, at 121 (“Upon termination 
of a marriage, a Facebook profile must be valued and assigned to one of the spouses. 
Additionally, any rights of reimbursement the community has due to the Facebook 
profile must be settled.”). 
 62 Id. at 121–22. 
 63 Id. at 122. 
 64 Banta, Property Interests, supra note 12, at 1149 (arguing that digital assets 
are in direct correlation with personal identities). 
 65 See infra notes 232–234 and accompanying text for discussion of an exception. 
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grounds, as well as the practical implications of the 
propertization of SNS profiles and the ways in which these 
accounts could (or should) be considered as a vehicle for the 
embodiment of the self and for creating communal ties. 
B. Legal Framework 
In recent years, popular media has exposed some painful 
stories of families devastated by the loss of a loved one, seeking 
access to their online account, only to have their request be 
rejected by the site.66 The problem of postmortem access has 
subsequently been framed in terms of property rights.67 The 
property framing has become so influential in public discourse 
that even private solutions such as SecureSafe and Legacy 
Locker (designed to guarantee postmortem access to chosen 
beneficiaries) are termed “digital estate plans.”68 
Generally, SNSs do not grant access to a user’s profile after 
his or her death.69 Company policies are legally enforced by terms 
of service (TOS) agreements that each new user accepts upon 
opening an account.70 Although social network profiles are 
commonly understood to “belong” to the user, the use is in fact 
controlled by the terms of the agreement between the service 
provider and the account holder.71 It is not possible to negotiate 
with the platform before accepting the contract, and many users do 
 
 66 See Louise Boyle, Grieving Parents Battle Facebook for Access to 15-year-old 
Son’s Profile After He Committed Suicide, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 19, 2013, 2:16 PM EDT), 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2280800/Facebook-bans-parents-accessing-sons-
profile-committed-suicide.html [http://perma.cc/8ER8-KJCE]; John Berlin, My Appeal to 
Facebook, YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPT28MGhprY 
[https://perma.cc/TTD7-XEAT]. 
 67 See e.g., Cahn, Probate Law, supra note 8, at 1703 (“Digital assets present 
the same problems as other forms of new property . . . .”). 
 68 CARROLL & ROMANO, supra note 16, at 86 (emphasis added). 
 69 See Lamm et al., supra note 8, at 400–01 (discussing terms of service 
agreements that deny third-party access). 
 70 Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users 
Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 406 (2010). 
 71 Banta, supra note 8, at 816–17. 
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not read it or fully understand it.72 Changes to the terms of service 
are also presented to the user as a sink or swim decision.73 
Facebook’s TOS agreement currently offers users two 
choices with regard to postmortem access.74 Users can choose in 
advance to have their profile either memorialized or 
permanently deleted from the site.75 If the user chooses to have 
his or her profile memorialized, the user chooses a legacy contact 
that can respond to friend requests, change the profile or cover 
photo, and write a pinned post for the profile.76 Nonetheless, the 
legacy contact cannot log into the account, read messages, or 
change past posts.77 Similarly, Instagram offers two options: 
memorialization or deletion of the account based on the request 
of the family members.78 
Twitter’s policies similarly deny access to the account of 
a deceased user.79 The site deactivates an account upon the 
request of verified immediate family members or a person 
authorized to act on behalf of the estate.80 LinkedIn’s policy in 
the case of death is limited to closing the account and removing 
the deceased’s profile.81 The no-access problem has inspired 
private technological solutions. Various private sites allow for 
 
 72 See Hartzog, supra note 70, at 408 (“Additionally, empirical and scientific 
research have demonstrated that an individual’s cognitive limitations and the design 
and presentation of standard-form contracts significantly frustrate an individual’s 
ability to properly read and understand standard-form contracts.”); see also Laura 
McCarthy, Digital Assets and Intestacy, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH L. 384, 390 (2015) (“Case 
precedent holds that whether a customer reads an agreement or not does not change the 
outcome of a dispute over a TOSA. The customer is still bound by the terms of the 
agreement. Thus, although a decedent may not have been aware of agreeing to any terms 
of service, the TOSA will apply when a representative of an intestate estate attempts to 
collect and subsequently distribute any digital assets to heirs. Further, just as a living 
account owner may not be able to delete his or her account, a TOSA may even prevent a 
representative of an intestate estate or an heir from deleting a decedent’s account.”). 
 73 McCarthy, supra note 72, at 390 (“[A]n Internet business can change its 
TOSA with or without notice.”) 
 74 See Memorialized Accounts, FACEBOOK HELP CTR, https://www.facebook.com/
help/1506822589577997 [https://perma.cc/SUS7-K6BY] (“You can choose to either appoint 
a legacy contact to look after your memorialized account or have your account permanently 
deleted from Facebook.”). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. (“A legacy contact is someone you choose to look after your account if 
it’s memorialized.”). 
 77 Id. 
 78 How Do I Report a Deceased Person’s Account on Instagram, INSTAGRAM HELP 
CTR., https://help.instagram.com/264154560391256/ [https://perma.cc/6YAY-JE6B]. 
 79 See How to Contact Twitter About a Deceased Family Member’s Account, 
TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/contact-twitter-about-a-
deceased-family-members-account [https://perma.cc/2YCW-97C6]. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Deceased LinkedIn Member—Removing Profile, LINKEDIN HELP, https://www.
linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/2842/deceased-linkedin-member-removing-profile?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/3YUK-NVXQ]. 
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the management of digital accounts after death by appointing 
digital heirs and providing easy access to certain materials.82 
Other than the TOS agreements, federal legislation may 
also impede access. The Stored Communications Act (SCA), 
initially enacted in 1986, was designed to respond to privacy 
concerns on the internet.83 The statute limits providers’ ability 
to disclose information voluntarily to the government or any 
other person or entity, including family members. According to 
Naomi Cahn, “[t]he drafters were focused on privacy, not on how 
the SCA might affect fiduciary property management and 
distribution, and the SCA has not been amended since its 
original enactment.”84 In addition, the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA) sanctions “unauthorized access of computer 
hardware and devices, and the data stored thereon.”85 
In recent years, several states have begun advancing a 
concrete solution to the problem of managing postmortem access 
to digital assets. Some states have modeled legislation on a 
version of the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
(UFADAA).86 The purpose of fiduciary access is to ensure 
continuity in the management of assets, prevent identity thefts, 
and console family members.87 The UFADAA was created, among 
other things, to incorporate digital assets into the estate plan and 
vest fiduciaries with the authority to access and manage digital 
assets.88 The Act originally allowed fiduciaries to “access, delete, 
preserve, and distribute digital assets as appropriate.”89 
Technology companies and privacy rights groups opposed 
this law due to “acute privacy concerns.”90 The association of e-
commerce businesses, NetChoice, proposed a rival piece of 
legislation, the Privacy Expectation Afterlife Choice Act (PEACA), 
which “aims to let fiduciaries have access to digital service 
providers to view only select contents of accounts.”91 The UFADAA 
 
 82 See Step by Step Expert Guide to Protecting Yourself Online Before You Die, 
FINDER AU, https://www.finder.com.au/infographics/life-insurance/expert-guide-to-protect-
yourself-online-before-you-die/ [https://perma.cc/44U7-K73Z]. 
 83 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012); Cahn, Probate Law, supra note 8, at 1700. 
 84 Cahn, Probate Law, supra note 8, at 1701. 
 85 Cahn et al., supra note 10, at 98; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
 86 See Access to Digital Assets of Decedents, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Feb. 25, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/access-to-digital-assets-of-decedents.aspx; Cahn et al., supra note 10, at 99; 
see also UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014). 
 87 See Cahn et al., supra note 10, at 93. 
 88 Id. at 107. 
 89 Victoria Blachly, Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act: What 
UFADAA Know, 29 PROB. & PROP. 8, 20 (2015). 
 90 Sy, supra note 8, at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). The PEACA required the 
executor to obtain a court order by proving that:  
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was subsequently revised to protect users’ privacy.92 The current 
version allows access to content only in the case the user consented 
in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other record.93 
The debate therefore identifies privacy concerns as the 
main theoretical obstacle to the inheritability of digital assets, 
including SNS profiles. In other words, barring privacy 
concerns, current law reform efforts tend to include digital 
assets as part of the deceased’s estate. This is not just one 
country’s view, though American law seems to be at the forefront 
of the legislation addressing this problem. There is no specific 
legislation currently in Canada94 or in England.95 American law, 
however, serves as an inspiration for other jurisdictions. The 
European Law Institute, for example, has announced new 
research looking into the success of the American Uniform Act.96 
In addition, France has advanced the Republique 
Numerique (Digital Republic) Act.97 One of its declared purposes 
includes securing users’ right “to consciously specify how they 
wish their personal data to be used after their death.”98 Article 20 
enables “any person, during his/her lifetime, to make 
 
(1) the user is deceased; (2) the deceased user was the subscriber to or customer 
of the provider; (3) the accounts of the deceased user have been identified with 
specificity; (4) there are no other authorized users or owners of the deceased 
user’s accounts; (5) disclosure is not in violation of the applicable federal laws; 
(6) the request for disclosure is narrowly tailored to effect the purpose of the 
administration of the estate; (7) the request seeks information spanning no 
more than a year prior to the date of death; and (8) the request is not in conflict 
with the deceased’s will. Then, the executor or administrator must give the 
internet service provider: a written request; a copy of the death certificate; and 
the court order. 
Id. at 665. 
 92 Id. at 649. 
 93 See REVISED UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2015) [https://perma.cc/L27U-WMYW]. 
 94 See VICTORIA HOCKLEY ET AL., DIGITAL ASSETS: DISPOSAL, RIGHTS AND 
SUCCESSION IN CANADA 2, Westlaw Practical Law (Mar. 2015); see also Tobi Cohen, 
Lawyers Raise Questions About Digital Data Rights After the Owner’s Death, CANADA.COM 
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://o.canada.com/news/national/lawyers-raise-questions-about-digital-
data-rights-after-the-owners-death [https://perma.cc/ZU6F-235E]. 
 95 See generally James Ward & Seddons Solicitors, Warning! Digital Assets—
The Future Is Upon Us, in PRIVATE CLIENT PRACTICE: AN EXPERT GUIDE 57 (Laura Slater 
ed., 2014) (discussing the lack of regulation of digital asset in England). 
 96 See Panel IV: Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets (feasibility study with ULC), 
EUR. L. INST. UPDATES (European Law Inst., Vienna, Austria), Sept.–Oct. 2015, at 7 
[https://perma.cc/XZ8Z-A2S3]. 
 97 See Loi 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une République numérique [Law 
2016-1321 of October 8, 2016 for a Digital Republic], Journal Officiel de la République 
Français [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 8, 2016, https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000033202746&categorieLien=id 
[https://perma.cc/6CV5-GKPA]. 
 98 The Digital Republic Bill—Overview, LA RÉPUBLIQUE NUMÉRIQUE, 
http://www.republique-numerique.fr/pages/in-english  [https://perma.cc/A8JD-3XFC]. 
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arrangements for the storage and communication of his/her 
personal data after his/her death,” and imposes a duty on Internet 
Service Providers to “inform the user about what will happen to 
this data after his/her death and let him/her choose whether or 
not to transfer it to the third party of his/her choice.”99 
Legislation seems to be moving in a certain direction. From 
a comparative law perspective, then, the time is ripe for engaging 
with the deeper questions of treating profiles as inheritable assets, 
including corporate manipulation of memory and loss. 
II. PLATFORM POWER AND USER AGENCY 
A. Theoretical Framework 
The debate surrounding postmortem access to SNS 
profiles has been particularly oblivious to the threat to users’ 
agency posed by social network platforms. The discourse in the 
field has asked the wrong questions, and consequently developed 
legal rules that are far too narrow and often misguided. 
In order to explore the impact of social network profiles 
on agency from a wider perspective, we engage with three very 
different approaches to the study of agency and power: (1) 
autonomy as choice and self-authorship (Joseph Raz)100; (2) 
relational autonomy (Jennifer Nedelsky);101 and (3) a critical 
theory of vulnerability (Martha Fineman).102 Together, these 
three approaches enrich the study of agency as a process of self-
constitution in the context of social networks. 
Although these theorists develop very different, and at times 
conflicting, accounts, this article argues that all three approaches, as 
applied to profiles on social network sites, offer a significant critique 
of SNS activity and its negative impact on agency and relationships. 
This article will show that all three perspectives help to highlight 
different aspects of corporate involvement in social network activity, 
and together they provide a rich, full critique of the threats 
embedded in, and what is lost by, skewing the discourse on social 
networks away from autonomy, agency, and relationships, and 
towards propertization and inheritability. 
 
 99 Explanatory Memorandum, LA RÉPUBLIQUE NUMÉRIQUE, http://www.republique-
numerique.fr/pages/digital-republic-bill-rationale [https://perma.cc/6VKT-ANLN]. 
 100 RAZ, supra note 29. 
 101 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY AND THE LAW 19 (2011). 
 102 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, 
Vulnerable Subject]. 
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Raz develops a classic approach to autonomy, which 
focuses on the self.103 Raz argues that “[p]ersonal autonomy is 
the ideal of free and conscious self-creation.”104 It requires “choice 
among an adequate range of options.”105 To be autonomous 
means to be the author of one’s life and have the necessary 
capabilities to perform this endeavor, free from coercion and 
manipulation. In Raz’s words: 
If a person is to be maker or author of his own life then he must have 
the mental abilities to form intentions of a sufficiently complex kind, 
and plan their execution. These include minimum rationality, the 
ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the 
mental faculties necessary to plan actions, etc. For a person to enjoy 
an autonomous life he must actually use these faculties to choose what 
life to have. There must in other words be adequate options available 
for him to choose from. Finally, his choice must be free from coercion 
and manipulation by others, he must be independent.106 
While the focus for Raz is on choice and the conditions for an 
adequate choice, Nedelsky focuses on relationships. In her book 
Law’s Relations, Nedelsky criticizes the liberal conceptions of 
autonomy and rights.107 She argues that human beings are not 
separate entities but rather interrelated. The self is constituted by 
relationships with other people.108 The selves “become who they 
are—their identities, their capacities, their desires—through the 
relationships in which they participate.”109 Nedelsky adds, 
however, that human beings are not just the sum of their 
 
 103 It is important to stress that our critique focuses on the threat of the current 
discourse to agency. Two of the three critical theories that we use to illustrate our point, 
namely Raz’s and Nedelsky’s, work with a conception of autonomy. While we believe that 
agency is a better theoretical concept for thinking about the harm in social network 
activity, we nonetheless see great value in using these accounts as a critical tool for two 
reasons: first, autonomy is closely linked to questions of personhood, agency, and the 
ability to form meaningful relationships. In this sense, autonomy analysis provides us 
with a sound framework with which to evaluate the harm of activity on SNS profiles. 
Second, in combination, and especially when complemented by vulnerability theory, we 
believe that all three theories form a broad spectrum along which to think about these 
questions. Vulnerability theory adds an important dimension to the analysis, as it 
stresses the vulnerable subject rather than the autonomous agent, whose independence 
and detachment from social context may mislead in the context of the power relations 
that characterize social media activity. Focusing on the social institutions that cultivate 
and preserve vulnerability, the theory is conducive to uncovering many of the harmful 
aspects of SNS profiles, as well as the limits of the current discourse. The aggregate 
critical weight of all three theories is therefore significant. 
 104 RAZ, supra note 29, at 390. 
 105 Id. at 389. 
 106 Id. at 372–73. 
 107 NEDELSKY, supra note 101, at 36. 
 108 Id. at 3 (“[R]elationships are central to people’s lives—to who we are, to the 
capacities we are able to develop, to what we value, what we suffer, and what we are 
able to enjoy. This book makes that relational dimension of human experience central to 
the concepts and institutions by which we organize our collective lives.”). 
 109 Id. at 4. 
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relationships. Relationships are constitutive, not determinative. 
Human beings have the ability to “make themselves who they are” 
through their capacity for creative interaction.110 Relational 
autonomy requires interaction with others and the capacity for 
genuine creativity within this interaction in order to avoid 
subordination and domination.111 In other words, to be autonomous 
is to be able to choose from a range of relational influences that we 
want to make our own.112 Nedelsky also argues for a different 
analysis of the law. A relational approach requires that the legal 
rules should be understood in terms of the relations they 
structure—and how those relations can foster core values.113 
While Raz and Nedelsky accept the concept of autonomy 
but provide different theories to support and supplement it, 
Fineman offers a more critical position.114 She argues that 
vulnerability, rather than autonomy, is inherent to the human 
condition, and is therefore the key to understanding and 
analyzing ethics, politics, and law.115 Fineman argues that the 
emphasis on contract, choice, and autonomy in liberal thought 
obscures the innate vulnerability of persons, as well as the 
institutional design that leads to it and sustains it.116 The theory 
focuses on the responsiveness of social institutions to 
vulnerability, and on the different resources available to different 
people at different points in their lives.117 Vulnerabilities thus 
 
 110 Id. at 31 (“Part of the modern sense of self, which I embrace even as I try to 
shifts its dominant conceptualization, is that human beings have a significant ability to 
make themselves who they are. The language I use is the capacity for creative 
interaction . . . with the emphasis on interaction with others as well as the capacity of 
genuine creativity. This capacity has many similarities with Hannah Arendt’s concept of 
‘the human ability to act . . . .’”). 
 111 Id. See generally Marilyn Friedman, Relational Autonomy and 
Individuality, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 327, 331 (2013). For some of the influence of the ideas 
of relational autonomy, see the collection RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & 
Natalie Stoljar, eds., 2000); DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND PERSONAL CHOICE 
138–40 (1989); John Christman, Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the 
Social Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL. STUD. 143 (2004). 
 112 See NEDELSKY, supra note 101, at 31 (“The very concept of relational 
autonomy presupposes that autonomy is possible for relational selves; and if that is so, 
then relationships cannot determine who a person is or what she does or becomes. 
Otherwise there would be no true autonomy.”). 
 113 Id. at 32. 
 114 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 102, at 2. 
 115 Id. at 1–2; see also Nina A. Kohn, Vulnerability Theory and the Role of 
Government, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3 (2014) (arguing that “vulnerability is inherent to 
the human condition, and that governments therefore have a responsibility to respond 
affirmatively to that vulnerability by ensuring that all people have equal access to the societal 
institutions that distribute resources. The theory thus provides an alternative basis for 
defining the role of government and a justification for expansive social welfare policies.”). 
 116 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 102, at 10–12 
 117 Id. at 20; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: 
Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 86 
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highlight power and privilege, as they “produce webs of 
advantages and disadvantages,” and expose “the institutional 
practices that produce the identities and inequalities in the first 
place.”118 Under vulnerability theory, the vulnerable subject 
replaces the autonomous and independent subject of the liberal 
tradition, which requires the state to be responsive to and 
responsible for the vulnerable subject.119 
As applied to SNS profiles, all three approaches to 
persons’ autonomy, agency, and vulnerabilities raise a variety of 
concerns. They require that people possess a range of options, 
create functioning relationships and an awareness of 
vulnerability and institutionalized privilege and power. We now 
turn to uncover the traits of social network activity, with a 
particular emphasis on Facebook. Our overall argument in this 
part is that current conditions of activity are a threat to agency 
under all three theories. 
B. Social Networks: Agency, Autonomy, and Power 
SNS profiles work with representations of the self.120 
These profiles contribute to users’ projected identity and to their 
ability to maintain certain social ties.121 Some psychologists argue 
that social media contributes to one’s self-esteem, popularity, and 
sense of belonging.122 Studies have also emphasized the role of 
 
(2012) (“The concept of a ‘vulnerable population’ is typically applied to those who are 
dependent in some regard, such as children or individuals with disabilities. There is 
certainly confusion between the terms, although dependency may even be more 
stigmatized than vulnerability. It should not be. As embodied beings, we are all 
constantly vulnerable to events that might render us dependent.”). 
 118 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 102, at 16. 
 119 Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject 
in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR 
LAW AND POLITICS 13, 16 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013). 
 120 Grimmelmann, supra note 41, at 1152 (“[A] social network site lets you say 
who you are. Erving Goffman observed that daily social interactions are full of attempts, 
large and small, to convince others to accept your claims about yourself. Online 
interactions are no different; you can use everything from your chat nickname to your 
home page to influence how other people think of you.”). 
 121 Id. (“Social network sites offer a gloriously direct tool for what Goffman calls 
‘impression management’: the profile page. Just as your choice of clothing and hairstyle 
signals how you think of yourself (and want others to think of you), so does your choice of 
profile photo. Many users choose to display the most flattering photographs of themselves 
that they can. Each additional datum is a strategic revelation, one more daub of paint in 
your self-portrait. Facebook’s profile fields aren’t a list of the things most important to its 
users; they’re a list of the things its users most want to say about themselves. The fact that 
half of the ‘Personal’ fields on a Facebook profile involve favorite forms of media isn’t an 
expression of consumerism; instead, it lets users communicate ‘prestige, differentiation, 
authenticity, and theatrical persona’ using a common cultural language.”). 
 122 Kasch, supra note 46, at 32; see also Amy L. Gonzales & Jeffrey T. Hancock, 
Mirror, Mirror on My Facebook Wall: Effects of Exposure to Facebook on Self-Esteem, 14 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV., AND SOC. NETWORKING 79, 79 (2011). 
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social media in building social capital because it facilitates the use 
of latent ties and maintains existing ties (creating a hybrid of 
offline and online relationships).123 These benefits are important. 
They represent a transformation of relationships and voice in the 
digital age. At the same time, however, the representation of self 
and the relationships on SNS are deeply flawed. 
To understand why, we must begin with the power 
structure of social network activity. The business model of social 
network platforms includes economic surveillance. Content on 
social media contains personally identifiable data that the 
networks systematically analyze, evaluate, and market to 
advertisers.124 The scope of this surveillance is far-reaching.125 
SNSs encourage users to engage as much as possible with the 
social media site.126 The result is that social media accounts 
archive “user activity, both intentionally shared user content 
and other transactional data, based on everything the user does 
via the site.”127 Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Alphabet, 
Google’s parent company, clearly explains: 
With your permission you give us more information about you, about 
your friends, and we can improve the quality of our searches. We don’t 
need you to type at all. We know where you are. We know where you’ve 
been. We can more or less know what you’re thinking about.128 
 
 123 See Kasch, supra note 46, at 32; Nicole B. Ellison et al., The Benefits of 
Facebook ‘Friends’: Social Capital and College Students’ Use of Online Social Network 
Sites, 12 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1143, 1144 (2007) [hereinafter Ellison et al., 
The Benefits of Facebook]. 
 124 THOMAS ALMER ET AL., MAPPING APPROACHES TO USER PARTICIPATION AND 
DIGITAL LABOUR: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE IN RECONSIDERING VALUE AND LABOUR IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE (Fuchs Christian & Fisher Eran eds., 2015) at 153, 165. 
 125 See Jan Fernback, Sousveillance: Communities of Resistance to the 
Surveillance Environment 30 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 11 (2013). Additionally, 
there is a lack of protection against surveillance. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015) 
(“Surveillance cameras, data brokers, sensor networks, and ‘supercookies’ record how 
fast we drive, what pills we take, what books we read, what websites we visit. The law, 
so aggressively protective of secrecy in the world of commerce, is increasingly silent when 
it comes to the privacy of persons.”). 
 126 Agnieszka A. McPeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and Consistent 
Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 893 (2013) 
(“[S]ocial media websites are multifaceted platforms that encourage users to perform other 
functions across the Internet—via the social media site itself or through third-party applications 
that are integrated with the social media site. The result is that social media websites contain 
layers of data that are either compiled by the website or created by the user.”). 
 127 Id. at 894. 
 128 Eric Schmidt: Google Gets Close to ‘The Creepy Line’, BIOCENTRE, 
http://www.bioethics.ac.uk/news/eric-schmidt-google-gets-close-to-the-creepy-line.php 
[https://perma.cc/LA43-L3J8]. 
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Indeed, according to one study, SNS providers regard their 
audience as self-concerned, frenetic, and willing to be monitored.129 
Avoiding economic surveillance proves to be difficult, 
probably impossible, even if users change their privacy 
settings.130 These companies typically offer users a terms of 
service agreement.131 These terms of use include privacy 
policies.132 A previous analysis of privacy statements on internet 
sites demonstrates that these statements offer little consumer 
protection and are targeted towards the commercial interests of 
the companies.133 The corporate attitude is perhaps most 
poignantly illustrated by another quote from Eric Schmidt: “If 
you have something that you do not want anyone to know, 
maybe you should not be doing it in the first place.”134 
Several key conditions create and maintain this power 
structure. First, many users are unaware of the scope of 
surveillance.135 A recent example is the Cambridge Analytica case. 
The company harvested the personal data of millions of users 
without their consent for political purposes.136 This controversy 
exposed the enormous vulnerability of personal data to various 
commercial companies. 
Second, even users who are aware of privacy concerns 
have an extremely limited decisional spectrum. Because many 
companies offer a “sink or swim” choice, if one wants to 
participate in social networks, there is no effective way to decline 
these policies altogether.137 Indeed, a user can decide not to 
participate at all. Considering the centrality of social networks, 
however, complete avoidance is difficult.138 Social networks  
 129 See Joseph Turow, Audience Construction and Culture Production: Marketing 
Surveillance in the Digital Age, 597 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103, 105 (2005). 
 130 SEBASTIAN SEVIGNANI, PRIVACY AND CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 95 (2015); see also McPeak, supra note 126, at 888–89; M. Ryan Calo, People Can 
Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 809, 825 (2010). 
 131 Hertzog, supra note 70, at 406. 
 132 ALMER ET AL., supra note 124, at 165. 
 133 Jan Fernback & Zizi Papacharissi, Online Privacy as Legal Safeguard: The 
Relationship Among Consumer, Online Portal, and Privacy Policies, 9 NEW MEDIA SOC’Y 
715, 716 (2007). 
 134 CNBC, Google CEO Eric Schmidt On Privacy, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6e7wfDHzew [https://perma.cc/563Y-T8G2]. 
 135 SEVIGNANI, supra note 130, at 100. 
 136 Sheera Frenkel & Kevin Roose, Zuckerberg, Facing Facebook’s Worst Crisis 
Yet, Pledges Better Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/
21/technology/facebook-zuckerberg-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/H4X6-HMGE]. 
 137 SEVIGNANI, supra note 130, at 100–01. 
 138 See Rahman, supra note 54, at 1670–72 (discussing Facebook centrality for 
access to media and its part in creating our informational infrastructure); see also How to 
Win Friends and Influence People; The New Face of Facebook, ECONOMIST (Apr. 9, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/04/09/how-to-win-friends-and-influence-people 
[https://perma.cc/MP4F-RVJ4]. 
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control information and communication in the digital age and, 
as previously discussed, have been characterized as a public 
utility.139 Within the digital communication world, Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, and other social networks ultimately offer 
the same service. Many users cannot find alternatives easily. 
They are therefore dependent on the platform and are exposed 
to manipulation and power imbalance. In addition, as previously 
discussed, the First Amendment now protects access to social 
networks.140 Social network accounts are an important path for 
personal expression and social interaction.141 The choice to opt 
out is necessarily bounded. 
Third, there is a built-in imbalance of power between 
SNSs’ platforms and users. SNS companies own the platform 
and control the terms of use.142 Users do not own the profile, nor 
do they control the terms of use or share the economic profit 
gained by using users’ personal data.143 
Take, for example, the frequent changes on SNSs to the 
terms of use, privacy issues, and even the characteristics of the 
“feed”—the heart of SNS relationships.144 These are all aligned 
with corporate interests and introduced unilaterally by the 
social network platforms in a “top-down” manner, instantly 
influencing the nature of the “res-publica” of millions of users.145 
In this important sense, SNSs should not be thought of as 
neutral facilitators of communication and relationships.146 They 
are, rather, a well-constructed arena, designed to maximize the 
profits of the corporations who own it.147 What we take to be 
 
 139 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 140 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); see also 
Trevor Puetz, Facebook: The New Town Square, 44 SW. L. REV. 385, 385 (2014) (“Centered 
on self-expression and the sharing of content, social networking sites (SNS) are now one of 
the strongest avenues for self-expression and are dependent upon freedom of speech.”). 
 141 Puetz, supra note 140. 
 142 ALMER ET AL., supra note 124, at 66. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See Cheryl B. Preston, “Please Note: You Have Waived Everything”: Can 
Notice Redeem Online Contracts, 64 AM. U.L. REV. 535, 585 (2015) (“Although 
the change required users to expressly grant permission for their information to be 
shared, the surrounding confusion and frequent changes made to Facebook’s privacy 
policy fueled public skepticism.”). 
 145 See id.; David Thompson, “I Agreed to What?”: A Call for Enforcement of 
Clarity in the Presentation of Privacy Policies, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 199, 203, 
210, 218, 220 (2012). 
 146 José van Dijck, Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data Between 
Scientific Paradigm and Ideology, 12 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 197, 199–204 (2014) 
(explaining and criticizing the industry position that SNS are neutral facilitators). 
 147 See Nicole S. Cohen, The Valorization of Surveillance: Towards a Political 
Economy of Facebook, 22 DEMOCRATIC COMMUNIQUÉ 5, 11 (2008); PASQUALE, supra note 
125, at 5 (“As middlemen, they specialize in shifting alliances, sometimes advancing the 
interests of customers, sometimes suppliers: all to orchestrate an online world that 
maximizes their own profit.”). 
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based on human reflection and decision making is often a 
manipulation, as “[t]he values and prerogatives that the encoded 
rules enact are hidden within black boxes.”148 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, is 
the type of engagement that the networks encourage users to 
partake in. Under the guise of a neutral platform, facilitating 
personal expression and fostering community ties, (“Be connected. 
Be discovered. Be on Facebook.”149), social network sites drive users 
to a particular type of expression and a specific mode of 
communication and connection with others. This is manifested in 
two ways: hyper-engagement, and a competitive, reward-laden 
environment that flattens social contexts, as the next section 
clarifies. All these factors demonstrate that the imbalanced power 
structure between users and SNSs distort the representation of the 
self, manifested in social media profiles. 
1. Hyper-Engagement 
Corporate power pushes users into any activity that 
provides more information that can be aggregated and sold150: 
the “share,” “comment” and “like” buttons are just one click away 
and users are constantly urged to communicate “[w]hat’s on 
[their] mind.”151 Similarly, the “feed” is designed as an infinite 
display of news, keeping the user scrolling down a page that 
never ends.152 No matter how far down one scrolls, the 
 
 148 PASQUALE, supra note 125, at 8. 
 149 Be Connected .Be Discovered .Be on Facebook, SPEAKERHUB, https://
speakerhub.com/files/be-connected-be-discovered-be-facebook-0 [https://perma.cc/KR3G-A4KS]. 
Facebook’s mission, as stated on its Facebook page, is to “[g]ive people the power to build 
community and bring the world closer together.” See Facebook, Bringing the World Closer 
Together, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/ [https://perma.cc/5CE3-PKKS]. 
 150 Tomer Shadmy, The New Social Contract: Facebook Community and Our 
Rights, 37 BOS. INT’L LJ (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 26) (“According to its yearly 
financial reports, Facebook generates most of its revenue from selling targeted 
advertisements and other commercial and sponsored content, based on the users’ private 
data and information.” (citation omitted)). 
 151 See Amy Morin, How You Answer Facebook’s ‘What’s On Your Mind?’ Question 
Reveals Your Personality Type, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
amymorin/2015/08/06/how-you-answer-facebooks-whats-on-your-mind-question-reveals-
your-personality-type/#51d229162421 [https://perma.cc/C3HN-WQCP] (discussing how 
people answer the what’s on your mind question); Josh Constine, Facebook Returns 
“What’s On Your Mind?” Prompt to the Home Page, ADWEEK (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://www.adweek.com/digital/whats-on-your-mind-home-page/ [https://perma.cc/3ZVT-KDFA] 
(explaining that users will always be greeted by this question, “which should lead them 
to contribute content more frequently”). 
 152 Cf. Christian Holst, Infinite Scrolling, Pagination or “Load More” Buttons? 
Usability Findings in eCommerce, SMASHING MAG. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.smashing
magazine.com/2016/03/pagination-infinite-scrolling-load-more-buttons/ [https://perma.cc/
62BN-VWV5] (discussing the benefits and costs of infinite scroll for usability). 
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information keeps flowing, as users are kept engaged.153 Studies 
show that the infinite scroll design contributes to a sense of loss 
of orientation and of time invested on the site: “Because there is 
virtually no end to the materials we can consume via infinite 
scrolling, we are vulnerable to consuming much more than we 
would normally without realizing it.”154 
Social network profiles also use notifications of “likes” 
and friend requests that are granted unpredictably.155 Facebook 
and Twitter send notifications to users when they are mentioned 
in someone else’s post.156 Instagram, for instance, sends 
notifications when someone likes a user’s photo.157 LinkedIn uses 
notifications in the same way, and notifies users of connection 
requests and potential job opportunities.158 These methods 
encourage hyper-engagement with profiles, and manipulate the 
representation of the self that the profile embodies. 
2. Competitive Environment. 
Corporate platforms influence and shape relationships 
on SNSs through the construction of the site and the structure 
of information flow. SNS encourages competition between users 
supporting a unique sensitivity to feedback. As pointed out in a 
study of addictions on the web, we are vulnerable to the 
responses of others, as well as inclined to reciprocate others’ 
social gestures: “human beings receive chemical satisfaction 
when they receive social gratification, such as likes.”159 SNSs 
take advantage of this and assume the role of “the attention 
merchants”:160 when a post does not receive any response, it is 
 
 153 Neyman, supra note 44, at 3. 
 154 Id. 
 155 There are many posts on how to increase likes and shares. See, e.g., Darren 
Rowse, A Quick Way to Get More Facebook Likes for Your Facebook Page, PROBLOGGER 
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://problogger.com/a-quick-way-to-get-more-facebook-likes-for-your-
facebook-page/ [https://perma.cc/D95S-UKQE]. 
 156 See What is Tagging and How Does it Work?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/124970597582337?helpref=search&sr=3&query=tagging 
[https://perma.cc/8HY7-7BDM]; About Notifications on Mobile Devices, TWITTER HELP 
CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/notifications-on-mobile-devices 
[https://perma.cc/6SZ3-T9SQ]. 
 157 How Do I Turn Push Notification on or off?, INSTAGRAM HELP CTR., 
https://help.instagram.com/546541825361643 [https://perma.cc/65E4-MBVW]. 
 158 Managing Your Linkedin Notification Updates, LINKEDIN HELP, https://
www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/76636/managing-your-linkedin-notification-
updates?lang=en [https://perma.cc/GQ6V-YK4V]. 
 159 Neyman, supra note 44, at 3 (citation omitted). 
 160 TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: FROM THE DAILY NEWSPAPER TO 
SOCIAL MEDIA, HOW ARE TIME AND ATTENTION IS HARVESTED AND SOLD 5–6 (2017). 
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considered unsuccessful.161 Facebook, for instance, designs its 
default settings of the news feed to show “top stories,” which are 
the posts by other users that got the most “likes,” “comments,” 
or “shares.”162 This is intended to reward the stories that have 
produced the most activity by others, and are therefore the most 
valuable to the corporate platform. 
These characteristics constitute an environment that is 
hypersensitive to social feedback—one that fosters a dependency 
on the approval of the crowd. This dependency again serves the 
corporate interest, as it encourages the production of information 
and the formation of links between pieces of information.163 
From a Razian perspective, it is clear that the users are 
neither independent nor self-governing in their activity on SNS 
profiles: choices are nudged, sometimes dictated; interaction is 
heavily mediated and manipulated.164 Vulnerability theory also 
shifts our attention from concepts such as “contract” and “consent” 
to actual vulnerability, and to the social institutions that exploit it, 
thus perpetuating the power imbalance between platforms and 
users, rather than enabling resilience.165 As a social institution, 
SNSs take advantage of people’s vulnerabilities for their economic 
ends.166 This is especially important, as studies show that the most 
vulnerable users are more exposed to manipulation than others: 
people’s need for popularity is strongly correlated with information 
disclosure, and indeed younger or single people tend to disclose 
more personal information than others.167 More disclosure means 
 
 161 Kasch, supra note 46, at 169. Non-response also engenders a negative 
personal feeling. Id. (“This focus or interest in comments and Likes also speaks to an 
often implicit underlying purpose for posting content to Facebook: to have others endorse 
your thoughts and ideas, and by extension, socially endorse you.”). 
 162 When users choose to change their setting to show the “most recent” posts—
thus undermining popularity and ratings—the site defaults back into “top stories” the 
next time the user logs back in. See Sean R. Nicholson, Permanently Set Your Facebook 
Feed To Show Most Recent Instead Of Top Stories, SOCMEDSEAN, http://www.socmed
sean.com/permanently-set-your-facebook-feed-to-show-most-recent-instead-of-top-stories/ 
[https://perma.cc/UJ8E-HWFB] (“In the desktop view of Facebook, there is an option to 
change from Top Stories to Most Recent, but Facebook only maintains that setting for 
about 24 hours and then it automatically reverts back to Top Stories.”). 
 163 See, e.g., danah boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: 
Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications, in A NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, 
COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 39, 46 (Zizi Papacharissi ed., 
2011) [hereinafter boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Public]. 
 164 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 165 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 102, at 2, 7, 10–11 (viewing contract 
as based on the liberal premise of consent and privacy and contesting this premise). 
 166 See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
 167 See Emily Christofides et al., Information Disclosure and Control on 
Facebook: Are They Two Sides of the Same Coin or Two Different Processes?, 12 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY. & BEHAV. 341, 343 (2009); cf. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra 
note 102 (arguing that everyone is vulnerable as a basic human condition based on our 
physical embodiment that leads to dependency). 
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more time spent, which means more information divulged. Studies 
also show that “social pressure and the Facebook environment 
affected the amount of information users presented.”168 
Within this distinct social arena, SNSs steer users’ activity 
into readymade templates.169 Social network sites are far from a 
neutral arena for interaction and are actually highly 
structured,170 with much less authorship than might be expected. 
In fact, SNS profiles cultivate a selective, inattentive to context 
and overly persistent persona, vulnerable to corporate control and 
manipulation. First, profiles on social media project a selective 
and partial representation of the self. Online representation tends 
to be overly positive.171 Kasch explains that “[s]tudents created 
these digital self-presentations as curations of their thoughts, 
personalities, and interests with selective and intentional gaps 
between who they were on Facebook and who they were in-person 
as a way to exert more control over their digital social lives 
through Facebook.”172 Although there are social psychologists that 
see the self as performing to an audience, this element is 
exacerbated in social media, where its presence is manifestly 
selective, dynamic, and distinct from the user.173 People are drawn 
to constant comparisons with what are often the idealized 
versions of the lives of others. Indeed, according to a recent 
survey, the pressure to present an image of a “perfect life” on 
social media is affecting the wellbeing of one in three girls.174 A 
poll conducted by the U.K. charity Girlguiding found that one 
third of girls between the ages of eleven and twenty-one consider 
their biggest worry online to be how they compare with others.175 
Indeed, SNS profile presence is highly selective and often 
amounts to no more than “role playing,” as if acting onstage. 
Accordingly, there is no enduring sense of self, but rather a constant 
need for the approval of an imaginary audience.176 This theory 
 
 168 Sinn & Syn, supra note 41, at 99 (emphasis added). 
 169 Examples include the public display of connections and the creation of public 
networking. See Kasch, supra note 46, at 28 (reviewing the relevant literature and 
explaining that “connections or links on these websites are mutual, public, un-nuanced, 
and decontextualized”). 
 170 Id. at 29 (discussing structural affordances of social networks, including 
data persistence, replicability of content, scalability of content and networks, and 
searchability of uploaded content). 
 171 Gonzales & Hancock, supra note 122. 
 172 Kasch, supra note 46, at 91 (emphasis added). 
 173 Id. at 92. 
 174 Sara Marsh, Girls Suffer Under Pressure of Online ‘Perfection’, Poll Finds, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/23/girls-suffer-
under-pressure-of-online-perfection-poll-finds [https://perma.cc/DS6H-UCUD]. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id.; see also Nina Haferkamp & Nicole C. Krämer, Social Comparison 2.0: 
Examining the Effects of Online Profiles on Social-Networking Sites, 14 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, 
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correlates nicely with the “SNS profile self”: users assume a 
selective, flat, online identity that is chosen for the purpose of getting 
them the love of the audience (in the form of likes and shares).177 In 
some cases or life events, people become interchangeable. On these 
occasions, the resemblance of users to each other is staggering: just 
think of your Facebook friends’ posts on Christmas morning, on the 
first day of school, and on Election Day.178 
These SNS traits support the observation that the power 
imbalance is not just the background to the activity, but rather 
shapes personal profiles as well as the activity itself. Indeed, 
Packingham v. North Carolina identifies the centrality of this 
activity to human interactions, but focuses on constraining state 
power and protecting access to these accounts.179 It is private power, 
however, that ultimately shapes the activity through subtle 
manipulation, affecting not only the level of activity but also its type, 
frequency, and nature, and with it, interpersonal interactions.180 
Yet another implication of commercial involvement in 
shaping the activity on profiles is that social network sites flatten 
social context.181 In offline social interactions, people present  
BEHAV., & SOC. NETWORKING 309, 309–12 (2011) (discussing the comparison culture on SNS 
and its impact on self-esteem). 
 177 See Marsh, supra note 174 (quoting Tom Madder, director of campaigns and 
communications at YoungMinds) (“With feeds full of idyllic holiday photos or groups of 
friends, it can be hard not to compare yourself to others or feel like you should be living 
the ‘perfect life.’ While it’s important to recognise [sic] and teach young people against 
dangers online, it’s also really important to acknowledge that social media can have an 
impact on young people’s wellbeing or exacerbate feelings of being left out.”); see also 
Erin A. Vogel & Jason P. Rose, Perceptions of Perfection: The Influence of Social Media 
on Interpersonal Evaluations, 39 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 317 (2017) (discussing 
self-presentation on SNSs and explaining that it allows for unique opportunities to 
present a selective image of the self). The study found that Facebook indeed influences 
perception of socially desired characteristics. Id. at 325. 
 178 Cf. Carmen K.M. Lee, Micro-blogging and Status Updates on Facebook: Text 
and Practices, in DIGITAL DISCOURSE: LANGUAGE IN THE NEW MEDIA 110, 115–16 
(Crispin Thurlow & Kristine Mroczek eds., 2011) (studying statuses on Facebook and 
creating categories including: “everyday life,” “What are you doing right now?,” “opinion 
and judgement,” and “reporting mood.”). 
 179 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36. 
 180 See Rahman, supra note 54; see also Ronit Donyets-Kedar, Rethinking 
Responsibility in Private Law, in PRIVATIZATION, VULNERABILITY, AND SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 34 (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. 
eds., 2017) (rethinking certain private law rules and doctrine to adapt to new forms of 
private power, discussing not only economic power but also the cultural and social role 
of corporations, and arguing that in a post privatization world, “where an increasing 
number of individuals are exposed to private law arrangements, a new, more robust 
concept of responsibility is required”); Gemma Newlands et al., Power in the Sharing 
Economy (The EU H2020 Research Project Ps2Share, working paper no.732117, 2017). 
 181 Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: 
Twitter Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA SOC’Y 114, 
114–15 (2010) (“We present ourselves differently based on who we are talking to and 
where the conversation takes place—social contexts like a job interview, trivia night at 
a bar, or dinner with a partner differ in their norms and expectations. The same goes for 
socializing online. Participants have a sense of audience in every mediated conversation, 
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themselves to others quite differently, depending on the social 
context.182 A job interview, a social gathering, or an intimate 
conversation will each yield different forms of communication.183 
We behave differently around our friends, family, coworkers and 
strangers. SNSs, however, employ a “one size fits all” platform.184 
A user maintains a single profile for all communication with 
family, friends, coworkers, and the broader audience.185 This 
uniform platform for all types of communication not only flattens 
users’ communication with others, but essentially streamlines the 
interaction into pre-constructed, corporate-manufactured patterns. 
The number of “friends” or “followers” on an SNS is extremely 
influential when it comes to impressions.186 
This is a product of social media sites’ operation as a 
private platform in a mediated public or semi-public space.187 
 
whether on instant messenger or through blog comments. This audience is often 
imagined and constructed by an individual in order to present themselves appropriately, 
based on technological affordances and immediate social context.”). 
 182 Id. at 114. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 115 (“Every participant in a communicative act has an imagined 
audience. Audiences are not discrete; when we talk, we think we are speaking only to the 
people in front of us or on the other end of the telephone, but this is in many ways a fantasy. 
(Social norms against eavesdropping show how ‘privacy’ requires the participation of 
bystanders.) Technology complicates our metaphors of space and place, including the belief 
that audiences are separate from each other. We may understand that the Twitter or 
Facebook audience is potentially limitless, but we often act as if it were bounded.”). 
 185 Kasch, supra note 46, at 25 (“Instead of being able to communicate in 
particular ways with each of those groups, and even with individual members within 
each of those groups, users are limited to only one form of communication with all users 
across all social contexts.”); see also danah boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: 
The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL 
MEDIA 119, 133 (David Buckingham, ed., 2008) (explaining the problem through analogy. 
The problem of flattening of social context is presented in all forms of mediated public. 
boyd considers Stokely Carmichael’s experience with radio and television, and clarifies 
that, “[a]s an activist in the 1960s, Carmichael regularly addressed segregated black and 
white audiences about the values and ideals of the burgeoning Black Power movement. 
Depending on the color of his audience, he used very different rhetorical styles. As his 
popularity grew, he started attracting media attention and was invited to speak on TV 
and radio. This opportunity was also a curse because both black and white listeners 
would hear his speech. As there was no way to reconcile the two different rhetorical 
styles he typically used, he had to choose. By maintaining his black roots in front of white 
listeners, Carmichael permanently alienated white society from the messages of Black 
Power. Faced with two disjointed contexts simultaneously, there was no way that 
Carmichael could successfully convey his message to both audiences.”). 
 186 See generally Sonja Utz, Show Me Your Friends and I Will Tell You What 
Type of Person You Are: How One’s Profile, Number of Friends, and Type of Friends 
Influence Impression Formation on Social Network Sites, 15 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED 
COMM. 314, 326 (2010) (arguing that a person’s “profile, profile pictures of the friends 
and number of friends jointly influence impressions”). 
 187 See boyd, supra note 185, at 125 (explaining the term mediated public by 
arguing that “[t]he types of publics that gather on social network sites and the types of 
publics that such sites support are deeply affected by the mediated nature of interaction. 
For these reasons it is important to distinguish these sites as publics, not simply public, 
and networked publics, not simply publics.”). 
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The implications are clear: when there is only one level of social 
relations, diversity, and complexity are obscured. In order to 
manage this flattening of social context, users exercise self-
censorship, write to a strategic audience,188 and present only a 
partial portrayal of themselves. Relations with others in SNSs 
become unified, with less sensitivity to differences. 
Birthdays are a good example of the flattening of social 
context and of the structural replicability that supports a 
pseudo-community. Facebook reminds users of friends’ 
birthdays and encourages users to congratulate them.189 Friends 
write birthday wishes on the user’s timeline as a way to foster 
intimacy and affection.190 Nonetheless, those sentiments are a 
superficial manifestation of intimacy.191 All of a user’s Facebook 
friends receive the same notification, including life partners, 
family members, coworkers, and casual acquaintances.192 They 
are all similarly encouraged to congratulate the user, making 
their birthday wishes effortless and, to some extent, impersonal. 
In addition, the user’s friends can see who congratulated them, 
and feel obligated to join the well-wishers.193 Birthday wishes  
 188 See, e.g., Marwick & boyd, supra note 181, at 119 (“The strategic use of Twitter 
to maintain followers, or to create and market a ‘personal brand,’ is part of a larger social 
phenomenon of using social media instrumentally for self-conscious commodification. In 
this process, strategically appealing to followers becomes a carefully calculated way to 
market oneself as a commodity in response to employment uncertainty.”). 
 189 Glenn Fleishman, How Facebook Devalued the Birthday FAST COMPANY (June 
4, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40550725/how-facebook-devalued-the-birthday; 
Cf. Martin S Fiebert et al., It’s Your Birthday!: Greetings as a Function of Gender and 
Relationship Status on Facebook, 4 INT’L REV. SOC. SCI. & HUMAN. 206 (2013) (measuring 
the percentage of birthday wishes a Facebook user received, along the lines of relationship 
status and gender, finding women in a relationship received the most greetings). 
 190 Mike Thelwall & David Wilkinson, Public Dialogs in Social Network Sites: What 
is Their Purpose?, 61 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 392, 401 (2010) (arguing that that 
birthday wishes posts generally served to initiate and maintain contact between friends). 
 191 See Nicole B. Ellison et al., Cultivating Social Resources on Social Network Sites: 
Facebook Relationship Maintenance Behaviors and Their Role in Social Capital Processes, 19 
J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 855, 859 (2014) [hereinafter Ellison et al., Cultivating Social 
Resources] (“Our measure also includes an item about publicly posting birthday wishes to a 
Friend’s Wall, which we believe signals attention to the recipient and performs a social 
grooming function. In summary, engaging in these relationship maintenance and attention-
signaling behaviors may be linked to expectations of access to social resources, both from one’s 
Facebook network and from one’s social network more generally.”). 
 192 See Kathy H. Chan, Never Forget a Birthday, FACEBOOK (Nov. 14, 2008), 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/never-forget-a-birthday/38780477130/ [https://
perma.cc/2QGD-S7BY]; see also Nukul, My Friends Don’t Get my Birthday Notification. 
How to Set it So?, FACEBOOK HELP COMMUNITY, https://www.facebook.com/help/
community/question/?id=1399245620381345 [https://perma.cc/VRX6-UZZA]. 
 193 Cf. Jen Doll, Please Don’t Wish Me Happy Birthday on Facebook, WEEK (Mar. 
28, 2017), http://theweek.com/articles/685933/please-dont-wish-happy-birthday-facebook 
[https://perma.cc/DT2P-8QVZ] (portraying her experience of receiving a birthday greeting 
on Facebook) (“Everyone came forth to say ‘Happy Birthday!!’ (with two exclamation marks 
or more, or it doesn’t count), or ‘Happy!’ (must have gotten cut off before he finished), or 
‘HBD,’ which in terms of stylistic birthday wishing has to be the laziest version on the 
planet. Some left full messages featuring inside jokes and deep, thoughtful feelings and 
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thus are flat, generic, and meaningless, yet are disguised as acts 
of affection, only to encourage cooperation. 
Hypersensitivity to feedback and flattening of social context 
distorts the user’s representation of self and social ties and harms 
the user’s autonomy and agency. Razian self-authorship, at least 
in its broadest interpretation, is harmed by the strong link between 
the representation of the self and the hyper-dependency on the 
response of others.194 SNSs encourage users to communicate a self 
that is likely to receive a response, and this greatly narrows the 
scope of choice that is free from corporate manipulation.195 
According to Nedelsky’s relational autonomy, rules and 
institutions should be evaluated by their influence on 
relationships.196 Social networks create and maintain relations that 
lack depth and sincerity. The platform encourages rapid responses 
and information-producing activity.197 The importance of social 
capital and the preservation of weak and latent ties is indisputable. 
Yet, as the representation of the self is inflexible and influenced by 
the corporate interest, relations remain superficial and even 
fictitious.198 Because social networks constitute a distinct area of 
activity that has become central in digital life, the characteristics 
of interaction are extremely significant for a relational inquiry. The 
constitution of autonomy as the ability to choose from a myriad of 
influences requires a rich field with various social contexts and a 
variety of interactions.199 Facebook’s option of closed groups200 
provides a valuable communal alternative to typical interactions. 
For the most part, however, the activity in groups usually (though 
not always) is similar to the typical Facebook interaction.201 Group 
activity also reflects selectivity, replicability, and hypersensitivity 
to social feedback. This type of relationship stands in stark 
 
vaguely inappropriate gifs, but most just expressed the sentiment plain and true, as 
handily urged to do by Facebook’s birthday calendar reminder. I had more than 100 such 
messages on my birthday, and a handful of belated wishes the day after.”). 
 194 See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. 
 196 See supra notes 107–113 and accompanying text. 
 197 See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra notes 189–193 and accompanying text. 
 199 See NEDELSKY, supra note 101, at 58. 
 200 See Shih-Ming Pi et al., A Study of Facebook Groups Members’ Knowledge 
Sharing, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 1971, 1971 (2013); see also Richardson, Virtual 
Property, supra note 37, at 756 (“There are also group pages, which ‘are meant to foster 
group discussion around a particular topic area.’ Some group pages are used to simply 
announce group meetings and highlight press clippings about the organization, while 
other group pages such as ‘Betty White to Host SNL (please?)’ are used as a tool to 
campaign for a particular goal.”); How Do I Create a Group on Facebook?, FACEBOOK 
HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/167970719931213?helpref=related [https://
perma.cc/KS2N-FFG7]. 
 201 Shadmy, supra note 150 (Section I.B). 
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opposition to Nedelsky’s theory of relational autonomy. In 
Nedelsky’s terms, SNS profiles condition our relations with others, 
rather than allow us to constitute relationships.202 
Vulnerability theory by Martha Fineman exposes the 
power structure that enables these relations. With its sensitivity to 
power and privilege, vulnerability analysis is helpful in uncovering 
the artificiality of SNS profiles as a reflection of the self, as well as 
the sparsity of the social ties formed within their context.203 
Vulnerability analysis also allows us to focus on social 
network sites as powerful, privately controlled, social 
institutions that shape the public sphere of speech and 
interaction.204 This privately-owned public arena does not foster 
resilience or respect for subjects, but rather preserves their 
inferior position vis-à-vis corporate power and exploits it. While 
a user’s consent to the terms of service seemingly fits with the 
liberal vision of a contract, it nonetheless obscures the 
vulnerability involved in the transaction.205 Acknowledging that 
all individuals are vulnerable even if they do not belong to a so-
called vulnerable group allows us to recognize the vulnerability 
of users qua users.206 It raises the need for protection and 
regulation of private power. 
Another, final problem with SNS activity is hyper-
documentation. A large part of the content on these profiles 
comprises random thoughts, chatter, and casual reactions.207 While 
our real life actions and interactions are passing, ephemeral, and 
fleeting, our online activities are documented, without any hierarchy 
or sifting process.208 SNSs such as Facebook thus become a 
repository for people’s activity—both the trivial and significant, the 
meaningless and thoughtful.209 This continuing curation is part of 
 
 202 NEDELSKY, supra note 101, at 4, 31. 
 203 Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 102. 
 204 Cf. Puetz, supra note 140, at 391 (“Beyond the opportunities for expression 
on the Timeline, News Feed, or within messages or group pages, Facebook has apps, 
such as Pages, Games, and the Marketplace, which allow users to delve even deeper into 
the community.”). 
 205 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 206 See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 102, at 9. Fineman’s theory 
suggests that we are all vulnerable because of our physical embodiment. Her argument 
detaches vulnerability from a specific population (elderly, children) and engages broadly 
with the human condition. She further explains “[v]ulnerability initially should be 
understood as arising from our embodiment, which carries with it the ever-present 
possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune from mildly adverse to catastrophically 
devastating events, whether accidental, intentional, or otherwise.” Id. This wider premise 
allows us to understand the vulnerability of all users, regardless of a particular affiliation. 
 207 See Kasch, supra note 46, at 8–11 (describing Facebook’s different functions 
and possibilities, including Likes, places, friends, etc.). 
 208 boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Public, supra note 163, at 46–47. 
 209 Kasch, supra note 46, at 107. 
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the modern inclination toward self-musealization and the cultural 
celebration of memory and the past.210 Because documentation is a 
default, almost every moment online is preserved and stored. The 
structural characteristics of SNSs encourage an ongoing, continuous 
exchange through shares, likes, and comments.211 Moderate 
documentation may contribute to a sense of stability and 
permanence, but this hyper-documentation creates a clutter and 
blurs any potential hierarchy in an enormous body of information 
and communication.212 The overwhelming documentation does not 
clearly distinguish among bits of meaning, and it celebrates the 
casual and trivial. Aggregating and documenting all these 
expressions not only creates clutter, but also interferes with our need 
for mundane, banal, non-memorialized moments. As discussed in 
Part IV, over-documentation is particularly problematic when it 
comes to representations of memory and continuity after death.213 
III. INHERITANCE, MEMORY, AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
A. Why Property? 
Access to social network profiles could be legally framed 
in various ways: as an essential commodity, as an expression, or 
as control of one’s privacy.214 The decision to characterize 
postmortem access as property is likely due to Anglo-American 
legal rules that distinguish between property rights that survive 
death and personal rights that do not.215 The question remains 
then as to which theory of property supports this 
characterization. Because most social network profiles do not 
 
 210 See Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia, 12 PUB. 
CULTURE 21, 24–25 (2000) (discussing “a popular obsession with ‘self-musealization’ by 
video recorder, memoir writing, and confessional literature; the rise of autobiography 
and of the postmodern historical novel with its uneasy negotiation between fact and 
fiction; the spread of memory practices in the visual arts, often centered on photography; 
and the increase of historical documentaries on television, including (in the United 
States) a whole channel dedicated entirely to history, the History Channel”). 
 211 See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text. 
 212 Cf. Sinn & Syn, supra note 41, at 95, 119–20 (discussing Facebook as creating a 
form of personal documentation and its implications for archival studies of personal history). 
 213 See infra Part IV. 
 214 See supra notes 49–63 and accompanying text. 
 215 See Lilian Edwards & Edina Harbinja, Protecting Post-Mortem Privacy: 
Reconsidering the Privacy Interests of the Deceased in a Digital World, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 83, 102–03 (2013) (“In the English, U.S., and other common law systems, the 
reigning principle has traditionally been actio personalis moritur cum persona, meaning 
personal causes of action die with the person . . . . By contrast, economic claims traditionally 
survive death in common law and pass to the heirs in testacy or intestacy. Indeed, the widest 
and most accepted definition of property (as opposed to personal right) is that which survives 
and transmits on the death of the proprietor. Reflecting this emphasis on economic rights, the 
term ‘personality rights’ is itself not recognized as a term of art in common law.”). 
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have an economic value,216 proponents of this approach need a 
theory that accounts for the personal and communal aspects of 
property. There are several possible avenues for such an 
exploration: personhood theory and the value of community are 
key alternatives. We begin by exploring some of these theories. 
Property’s role in shaping and reflecting identity is 
celebrated by modern personhood theories. These theories 
emphasize the role of possessing and controlling property as 
conducive to self-development.217 Property, according to the 
argument, is a vehicle for the embodiment of the self, because 
property has a stable and continuous presence that carries 
memories, ideas, and plans.218 In this light, Margaret Radin argues 
that the home is a “scene of one’s history and future, one’s life and 
growth,”219 and the private car is “the repository of personal effects” 
and serves as “the backdrop for carrying on private thoughts or 
intimate relationships.”220 Note that this argument has a strong 
temporal component. Jeremy Waldron explains that “the actions 
that an individual performs on or with the object now may 
constrain or determine the actions that he can perform on or with 
it later.”221 Property therefore embodies a will by forcing the 
individual to become consistent and stable over time. 
This position is not monolithic.222 Margaret Radin’s 
argument, for example, relies on a foundational distinction 
between fungible assets and personhood property.223 Money 
differs from a wedding ring or someone’s home. She suggests “a 
hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely connected with 
personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”224 This hierarchy  
 216 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 217 See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 
(1982); Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks 
to the Public Domain—with an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392, 1397–1406 (1993); Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and 
Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 93, 135 (2011) (arguing that 
attachment to possession is so abundant that there is no need of legal possession); Jeanne 
Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: Margaret Radin’s Imagery of Personal Property as 
the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55, 56–57 (1994); Joan Williams, The 
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280 (1998); see also Dudley Knowles, Hegel on 
Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 56–57 (1983); compare Marc R. Poirier, The 
Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 343 (2008), for the analysis of cultural property. 
 218 ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 34–38 (1995); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 352 (2002). 
 219 Radin, supra note 217, at 992. 
 220 Id. at 1001. 
 221 WALDRON, supra note 218, at 373. 
 222 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Property Without Personhood, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 
771, 783–99 (2017) (contributing a critique of Radin’s theory and discussing the 
normative aspects of the theory). 
 223 Radin, supra note 217, at 986. 
 224 Id. 
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reflects the right-holder’s subjective evaluation. This reflection, 
however, is accompanied by a normative judgment. Radin is well 
aware of the duality that lies in property relations. She explains: 
In this view, the relationship between the shoe fetishist and his shoe 
will not be respected like that between the spouse and her wedding 
ring. At the extreme, anyone who lives only for material objects is 
considered not to be a well-developed person, but rather to be lacking 
some important attribute of humanity.225 
This normative judgment clarifies that the value of property 
cannot be reduced to the right-holder’s preference: there are 
normatively valuable attachments and, contrarily, there are 
attachments that the law does not endorse. 
Personhood theory is not limited to physical property, 
personal and real. Intellectual property scholars also refer to 
personhood theories to justify the protection of intellectual 
property generally,226 and to support the moral standing of 
copyright in particular.227 Creative work, according to the 
argument, reflects “an embodiment of [the author’s] message.”228 
It is tempting to consider social network profiles along 
these lines. SNS profiles have a strong temporal component 
because they provide consistent documentation of experiences.229 
The profile is a stable, persistent manifestation of thoughts, 
feelings, and opinions, which supposedly could be considered as 
a “scene of one’s history and future.”230 In addition, the 
information they host tends to be personal and reflect the 
preferences and tastes of the user.231 The profile represents the 
user’s persona: her wants, needs, status, and choices. In a 
similar spirit, Natalie Banta argues that people personally 
 
 225 Id. at 961. 
 226 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
330–31 (1988). 
 227 See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 795, 845 (2001) (“Conceptually, the dignity-based right of integrity is a 
personal right, one that demands respect for the author’s person (and the person’s artist), 
her personhood, and inviolate personality, as reflected in her creation. All of these interests 
must be said to terminate with the death of the author.”) (emphasis in original); See also 
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 
(2012) (“Another group of scholars reasons instead that creators deserve moral rights in 
their works . . . because the works are important components of creators’ personhoods (the 
aspects of creators’ personalities infused into and bound up in their works).”). 
 228 ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL 
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 25 (2010). 
 229 Lanfranco Aceti, Eternally Present and Eternally Absent: The Cultural 
Politics of a Thanatophobic Internet and its Visual Representations of Artificial 
Existences, 20 MORTALITY 319, 319–20 (2015). 
 230 Radin, supra note 217, at 992. 
 231 Belk, supra note 24. 
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identify with social network accounts.232 They reflect “how the 
world sees us and how we see ourselves.”233 Banta’s conclusion is 
that social network accounts are property, and that users should 
possess the power of alienability.234 
Although this conclusion is intuitively tempting, the 
intuition is misleading. Personhood theory is not merely 
reflective; it requires a normative evaluation. This analysis 
misses other important traits of SNS profiles, including the 
exact forms of representation, the tendency towards over-
documentation, the hypersensitivity to the feedback of others, 
and corporate involvement, all of which constitute and construct 
a performative self. The harm to agency and to autonomy 
influences the embodiment of personhood. These traits create a 
distorted representation of the self, which is potentially 
normatively questionable, much like the shoe fetishist.235 
Personhood theory allows us perhaps to engage with SNS 
profiles and characterize them as property prima facie. It 
requires, however, significant normative work and legal reform 
to ensure the agency of the user. The normative stance of 
personhood as self-development crumbles without it. 
Moreover, property is not only a construct of individual 
identity. As many scholars have noted, it is also a platform for 
human interactions.236 Relational and communal approaches to 
property insist that property does not just set boundaries but also 
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 235 See supra text accompanying note 225. 
 236 See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 48–54 
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Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L. J. 549 (2001) (explaining the benefits 
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community for the value of land). see also Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm 
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009) (presenting an alternative to the 
dominant property view that highlights the social obligation norm). Alexander explains:  
[A]n owner is morally obligated to provide to the society of which the individual 
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constructs relationships,237 and that sharing property interests 
serves to protect vulnerable parties.238 Property builds, creates, 
and shapes community, because people who share a space 
gradually become meshed together.239 Whether they share a 
home, a condominium, a neighborhood, or even a workspace, a 
property’s spatiality contributes to communal ties.240 Property 
serves as the foundation for the community, a platform for 
cooperation and sharing, and inspires duties to the community.241 
SNS profiles cultivate relationships and support 
communities, and presumably serve as valuable platforms for 
interaction and cooperation. The nature of these relations, 
however, is disputed. The research on social media demonstrates 
that Facebook facilitates the maintenance of latent, weak ties, 
or ties that already exist.242 It has a significant role in building 
social capital, as it allows for a wide network of thin connections 
and makes it easier to communicate information and form 
common ground with others.243 As explained above, however, 
social networks often maintain superficial ties that obscure 
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diversity and complexity.244 They flatten social contexts and 
breed a form of corporate structured intimacy. 
The interim conclusion is that conceptualizing social 
network profiles as digital property is complex. Analytically, it 
requires further development; normatively, it faces critical 
obstacles considering the harm to users’ agency discussed above.245 
B. Memory and Loss 
There are two possible arguments that support the 
current legal trend in favor of treating social network profiles as 
digital assets. The first argument concerns the user’s wishes to 
grant access to loved ones, because he or she wants to be 
remembered at least partly for their online activity.246 The 
second argument highlights the need of loved ones to hold on to 
the memory of the deceased. Posts, likes, shares, and photos 
represent, according to this view, the deceased and his or her 
persona.247 They provide relatives with a way to remember who 
he or she was. Both arguments make the implied assumption that 
the profile represents the identity of the user, and as such, serves 
as a desired platform for continuity of the self, relationships, and 
memory. This assumption, however, is not self-evident. It calls for 
a detailed examination of the characteristics and practices of 
identity building in the digital world, and the communal 
relationships it hosts. 
The arguments revolve around memory and continuity. 
These arguments understand access to profiles as a way to cope with 
the death of a loved one. The human need to transcend mortality is 
well documented in an array of studies from several disciplines.248 
Continuity offers individuals a connection to the world of culture, 
which may transcend our concrete existence.249 This connection is 
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established through cultural artifacts such as architecture and art, 
family and friendship, or history and symbols.250 
There are two corresponding needs: individuals seeking to 
transcend their own mortality by controlling their memory (writing 
letters, executing a will, or engaging in meaningful relationships), 
and family and friends’ need for roots, to belong to the deceased and 
cherish their memory.251 In the case of postmortem access, these 
corresponding needs are packed into the property law discussion. 
They are characterized as property, which allows for their 
management as part of the decedent’s estate.252 
Profiles are understood as artifacts of continuity and 
representations of the self. These are, however, flawed 
representations. In addition to the flaws mentioned above 
(hypersensitivity to feedback, power structure, and flattening of 
social context),253 over-documentation is particularly distortive when 
it comes to memory and representation.254 All information on social 
networks is preserved and documented. Every casual interaction, 
random expression or occasional reaction is stored as a default. 
In terms of self-construction, this clutter is reductive. To 
better illustrate the point, think of Jorge Luis Borges’ famous 
short story “Funes, the Memorious.”255 The story tells the tale of 
Funes, disabled by a terrible accident, who also suddenly 
possesses the extraordinary capacity to remember everything: 
“Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree of every 
wood, but also every one of the times he had perceived or 
imagined it.”256 This powerful ability proved to be destructive. 
The narrator concludes, “I suspect, however, that he was not 
very capable of thought. To think is to forget differences, 
generalize, make abstractions. In the teeming world of Funes, 
there were only details, almost immediate in their presence.”257 
Now imagine, for example, that one’s every move, 
conversation, idea, and interaction is recorded and documented. 
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This documentation is made available after one’s death. What is 
the value of this all-encompassing documentation? Suppose 
further that Skype conversations are automatically recorded, that 
one’s ongoing presence on closed-circuit television258 could be 
snipped and made available to her family after her death, or that 
Waze259 or Google Maps stores information about travel routes 
and preferences: will family members ask for access to this 
information as well? Is such a request reasonable or desirable? 
Indeed, after a loved one passes away, there is something 
comforting in accessing every available piece of memory. Yet 
aggregating and documenting all of these expressions not only 
creates clutter, but also interferes with our need for mundane, 
banal moments that are not memorialized. Continuity is a project 
of interconnectedness, and it builds on culturally significant 
forms of communication and meaning. It does not, however, 
suggest an unfiltered amassing of every passing expression, every 
fleeting gesture, and every click of a mouse. 
The characterization as artifacts of continuity heavily 
relies on the tenets of succession. Anglo-American succession law 
is fundamentally tied to testamentary freedom.260 Although 
certain common law jurisdictions protect the interests of family 
members, the will of the deceased is the primary concern of the 
law.261 Postmortem access is similarly understood as a matter of 
the will of the deceased, according to the current version of the 
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American Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, as is 
discussed before.262 
Combining representation and memory with the 
framework of property and succession, however, requires more 
analytical work. The extant literature does not fully explain why 
the best conceptualization is inheritance.263 Moreover, the 
argument is also normatively incomplete. The harm to agency 
and autonomy should affect the legal conception of 
representations. The current discourse frames postmortem 
access as a standard inheritance case where the decedent and 
her family members are the only stakeholders. In reality, of 
course, the platforms are de facto stakeholders in a specific 
profile and more generally in all the profiles, active and inactive, 
as they constitute the platform’s activity and main assets. They 
manipulate the presumed asset and its devolution.264 Given this 
triad, the problem of postmortem access to profiles is peripheral. 
The central discussion remains how to protect the agency of 
users.265 Only once regulation has secured their agency can SNS 
profiles start serving as a representation of their self and ties. 
IV. LAW REFORM 
The thrust of this project is critical. It aims to prompt a 
rethinking of current law reform trends and highlight the lack 
of consideration of corporate manipulation and user protection. 
The argument, however, has implications for the regulation of 
postmortem access to these profiles. This article discussed these 
implications in broad strokes, leaving the details for future 
research. Our general recommendation is that the power 
structure between the corporation and the users should stand at 
the center of regulation. This problem is not directly related to 
inheritance, but the inheritance debate presupposes it. Unless 
agency, in its broader sense, is secured and liberated from 
power, a discussion of inheritance is futile. It actually serves to 
perpetuate dominance. 
The current argument in favor of inheriting digital assets 
does not call for a significant change in the terms or conditions 
of the activity.266 Such a narrow claim reproduces and reinforces 
 
 262 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 263 The discussion typically begins with a declaration of property as an evolving field, 
with new assets being produced in changing times. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 8, at 1702–03. 
 264 See supra Section III.A. 
 265 Id. 
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policy but calling for no substantive changes to the terms); Cahn, Probate Law, supra 
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corporate power. By recognizing the importance of profiles for 
one’s personhood and relations with others,267 the current claim 
reaffirms the cultural force of SNS profiles and solidifies its 
standing. The more culturally valuable the profile becomes in 
the eyes of users, the harder it becomes to avoid participation.268 
Once participation is in motion, SNSs encourage sharing of 
additional information and the documentation of the self, which 
is in turn aggregated and sold to third parties.269 This article 
therefore calls for resistance to corporate power. 
Possible reforms include limiting economic surveillance, 
providing more user choice in privacy setting vis-à-vis the 
platform, and regulation of SNSs’ control of access to new and 
existing users.270 These suggestions are far-reaching and may be 
hard to implement, but they are nonetheless a necessary step. 
The threat to representation of self and memory is not 
only a product of corporate manipulation. Over-documentation 
threatens the oral, fleeting, casual part of our identity. Because 
social media profiles are structured as consistent and 
permanent, documentation becomes obvious and imperative. A 
new wave of social networks like Snapchat, however, follows the 
younger generation’s preferences for unpreserved information.271 
Snapchat is based on the opposite principle: communication is 
immediately deleted after it is read.272 As Snapchat clarifies: 
“Snapchat is not—and never has been—stockpiling your private 
Snaps or Chats. And because we continue to delete them from 
our servers as soon as they’re read, we could not—and do not—
share them with advertisers or business partners.”273 Although 
we do not endorse Snapchat’s business model, its policy 
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demonstrates the function of documentation for business 
purposes. Nonetheless, Facebook, Instagram and other SNSs 
continue to control the market.274 
We suggest that the SNSs periodically delete content of 
the profile as a default rule. Users will be able to characterize 
certain posts as “memories,” signifying that they have unusual 
importance for the user. This mechanism would separate the 
trivial, casual, and mundane from the occasional significant 
moment. It therefore confronts the normative problem of clutter 
and lack of hierarchy that is inherent in over-documentation. We 
suggest including this rule as part of the legislation that 
regulates the postmortem devolution of assets. 
It is important to distinguish between this proposed 
exception and the approach of the revised UFADAA. The revised 
UFADAA’s default rule is that a fiduciary will have access to a 
catalogue of the deceased’s communications, but not access to 
their content, unless the user consented.275 The reason, as 
described in Part I.B, is privacy concerns.276 The concern is that 
people who were close to the deceased will be exposed to private 
information; it is not an economic surveillance concern. In 
contrast, the proposed mechanism of “memories” concedes that 
some activity may have normative value for personhood and 
continuity. The mechanism serves as a proxy for processing huge 
amounts of information and managing over-documentation 
without ignoring possible meaningful forms of communication. 
These suggestions serve as examples of the kind of 
normative analysis that should guide law reform. The general 
principle persists: unless social network sites are substantially 
reformed, a discussion of inheritance is unproductive and harmful. 
Deletion is a form of resistance to the normative problems 
embedded in social media. 
CONCLUSION 
Platform power is one of the main policy concerns of our 
era. Despite its importance, scholars have not explored its 
application to the problem of postmortem access to digital assets. 
This article has asked whether it is normatively sound to 
conceptualize social network profiles on such sites as Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, and LinkedIn as inheritable property. It 
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considered platform power to structure interaction, manipulate 
relationships, and support a selective representation of the self. 
Following this new perspective, this article has examined 
the current trend in popular opinion and legislative reforms to 
include these assets in the deceased’s estate. Against this 
background, we claim that SNS profiles should not be viewed as 
inheritable property and argue in favor of a broader perspective. 
The inheritance debate must be both mindful of the triad of 
stakeholders and sensitive to platform power and the harm to 
autonomy and agency. This article thus serves to provoke an in-
depth normative analysis of social media profiles before reaching 
a conclusion with regard to their inheritability. 
